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INTRODUCTION

It may be easy, at least for people who do not live near Confederate monuments
in public spaces, to assume that these monuments represent little more than links to
a shameful and long-ago past.2 From this assumption one might then view these
monuments as a sort of last stand; the atavistic echo of a country that was, but is no
longer, cemented into the present by their monumental form though ultimately
doomed to erode in the undefined future. But, unpleasant though it may be to
consider or admit, the truth is that many remaining Confederate monuments embody
aspects of their communities that remain vital into the present, and which they help
to anchor and renew.
The monuments to former Confederates along Monument Avenue in Richmond,
3
Virginia, provide one of the clearest examples of this truth. Running through a
historic part of Richmond that was for many years the city's ceremonial parade route,
Monument Avenue is one of only two National Historic Landmark districts within
the city.4 It is significant for its landscaping and the nearby architecture, as an
example of city planning, and most notably for the many monuments that mark its
5
major intersections, including a recent monument to tennis hero Arthur Ashe,
6
another monument to oceanographer Matthew Fontaine Maury, and many more
monuments to former Confederate generals and politicians.' As the preceding
sources make clear, Monument Avenue is an important part of Richmond's history
and identity as well as a focus for tourism. It has also been a repeated site of protests
and civic deliberation about whether, why, and how its Confederate monuments
should be removed or retained.'
2

As used in this Article, the term "monument" refers to any specific physical landmark, object, or

place, whether built or natural, which is set aside from ordinary use for special attention, regard, or study,
and which tends toward at least some limited display or special communal use. For more detail on this
and other definitions of the term, legal and non-legal, see, for example, Zachary Bray, We Are All Growing
Old Together: Making Sense of America's Monument-Protection Laws, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 14 17) (on file with author and law review).
3 See Mark ltolmberg, Why Monument Avenue Is Safe as Other Cities Remove Civil War Statues,
WTVR.CoM (Apr. 28, 2017, 1:08 AM), https://wtvr.com/2017/04/28/why-monument-avenue-is-safe-ascities-remove-civil-war-statues! [https://perma.cc/XGV8-K5119] (arguing that the monuments to former
Confederates on Monument Avenue are unlikely to be removed because they "are a rock-solid part of
Richmond's $1,7 billion dollar tourism industry").
4
Monument
Avenue
Historic
District,
NAT'L
PARK
SERV.,
nps.gov/nr/travel/Richmond/monumentavehd.html [https://perma.cc/6T6B-FXN8]; see also Historic Sites:
Monument Avenue, VIRGINIA, virginia.org/listings/tlistorieSites/MonumentAvenue [https://perma.cc/K64JBBTZ] (describing Monument Avenue as "[o]ne of America's most beautiful boulevards" where "[tjum-of-thecentury mansions face historic monuments of Civil War heroes and other famous Richmonders").
See Brad Kutner, The History otheArthurAshe Monument in Richmond, STYLE WK[LY. (Aug. 22,2017),
https://www.styleweekly.com/richmond/the-history-of-the-arthur-ashe-monument-inrichmond/Content?oid-4237161 [https://perma.cc/FSR7-DGEH].
' See Harry Kollatz, Jr., Mauty and His Maker, RICHMOND MAG. (Mar. 24, 2010, 12:00 AM),
https://richmondmagazine.com/news/inaury-and-his-maker-03-24-2010/[https://pemia.cc/F3GG-KRY9].
7 Monument Avenue Historic District,supra note 4.
See, e.g., Harry Kollatz,Jr.,SomethingSomedavCouldIlappenonMonument Avenue, Maybe, RICHMOND
MAG. (July 3, 2018, 5:22 PM), https://richmondmagazine.com/news/news/something-someday-could-happenon-monument-avenue-maybe/ [https://perma.cc/7T4G-KLR4] (describing the work of the city's Monument
Avenue Commission, which began to meet shortly before the violence in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017, and
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Richmond's Monument Avenue is surely one of the easiest places to see the
enduring and, to many, troubling vitality of Confederate monuments in public
spaces. But there are many other examples of this trend beyond the Confederacy's
former capital. For example, following the removal and relocation elsewhere in
Kentucky of a Confederate monument that long stood near the University of
Louisville,9 much attention in that city has turned to the continued presence of a
monument to John Breckinridge Castleman--a monument that has been associated
for many years with the Louisville neighborhood in which it stands. 0 Although he
is little known outside of Louisville, Castleman was a noted equestrian in a city that
has long drawn much of its identity as well as its appeal to tourists from its
association with horses." He was also a general in the United States Army and a
civic leader who, some have argued, was instrumental in developing Louisville's
remarkable system of civic parks.' 2 Finally, Castleman was also a Confederate
military leader in Kentucky during the Civil War, 3 and although the monument of
Castleman on his horse shows him in civilian clothes rather than a military uniform,
one side of the nearby memorial plaque that commemorates his military service gives
pride of place to his leadership in the Confederacy.' 4

discussing Virginia's statue statute); Jackie Knmszewski,Is MonumentA venue Set in Stone?, STYLE WKLY. (Apr.
4, 2017), https://www styleweekly.com/richmond/is-monument-avenue-set-in-stone/Content oid-2909428
[https://perma.cc/49MQ-UYTR] (describing, prior to the creation of the Monument Avenue Commission and
the violence in Charlottesville, the recurring conflict over Monument Avenue).
' Zachary Bray, Monument" of Folly: How Local Governments Can Challenge Confirderate "Statue
Statutes,"'91 TEMP. L. Rtv. 1,3-4 (2018) (discussing the history, removal, and relocation of this monument).
10 Ashlie Stevens, Cherokee Triangle Residents Split on Castleman Statue
Removal,
89.3 WFPL NEWS (Aug. 9, 2018), https://wfpl.org/cherokee-triangle-residents-split-on-castleman-removal/
[https://pemia.cc/WQY5-XVJD] (describing how the monument of Castleman on his horse has long "been
synonymous with the Cherokee Triangle neighborhood," where it has been used in "neighborhood association
literature, as the mascot of the [neighborhood] art fair, and as a landmark for giving directions"),
''Thomas Novelly, A ControversialStatue: 5 Things to Know AboutJohn B. Castleman,COURIERJ. (Aug. 18,
2017, 4:12 PM), https://www.courir-jowuna.com/story/news/history/2017/08/15/controversial-statue-5-thingsknow-john-b-castleman/569138001/ [https://perma.cc/AV62-QKZP]. For a thoughtfil examination of Louisville's
deliberate identification with both horses and a constructed "Southern" past, see generally JAMES C. NicHOLSON,
TI tEKENTUCKY DERBY: Ilow TFI RUN FOR TIHE ROSES BECAME AMERICA'S PREMIER SPOR TINGi EVENT (2012).
12 E.g., Evan I leichelbech, Cherokee Residents Appeal Louisville 's Decision to Remove
Castleman
Statue, 89.3 WFPL NEWS (June 10, 2019), https://wfpl.org/cherokee-residents-appeal-louisvillesdecision-to-remove-castleman-statue/ [https:Hperma.cc/25Trz-SFTE]; Novelly, supra note II. But see
Eric Burnette, Opinion, Thank Andrew Cowan for Parks, Not Castleman, COURIER J. (Aug. 14, 2017,
1:16 PM), https://www.courier-journal com/story/opinion/contributors/2017/05/26/give-andrew-cowanstatue-thank-him-parks-erie-bumette/323825001/
[https://perma.cc/VZN5-Z211K]
(arguing
that
Castleman was "self-interested, vainglorious, [and] largely ineffective" in his involvement with
Louisville's parks aside from being a key contributor to Louisville's grim legacy of public park
segregation); Ricky L. Jones, Keeping the Statue Is Preserving Lies, LEO WKLY. (May 8, 2019),
https:/www.leoweekly.coin/2019/05/keeping-statue-preserving-lies/
[https://perma.cc/Q5114-F3KC]
(gathering sources and arguing, inter alia, that Castleman had less to do with the creation of Louisville's
parks than many have suggested).
"3Novelly, supra note I I (noting Castleman's Confederate military service and quoting his support
for segregation from a long-ago letter sent to and published by the Courier-Journal during his involvement
with Louisville's parks).
" See Chris Kenning, U.S. CitiesStep Up Removal of'ConljederateStatues, Despite Virginia Violence,
REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2017, 6:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-virginia-protests-statues/u-scities-step-up-removal-of-confederate-statues-despite-virginia-violence-idUSKCN lAVOXE
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As the stories of the Castleman monument and Monument Avenue help to
illustrate, at the local level, arguments in favor of retaining Confederate monuments
often boil down to two main points that are tied into the alleged purpose and present
value of contested Confederate monuments. First, monument defenders frequently
invoke the alleged beauty of the monuments at issue--or, at least, the beauty of their
surroundings-in order to support arguments that the monuments' purpose was
5
relatively benign, or at least not entirely racist. The alleged beauty of Confederate
monuments is also used to support a closely related set of arguments that retaining
the monuments in more or less their original condition has some enduring present
value.' 6 And second, monument defenders argue that retaining the monuments
represents an important link with the past-a link that is frequently couched in terms
of a vaguely defined or undefined sense of "heritage" -which should not be severed,
7
even if the past enshrined in these monumental forms is unworthy of celebration.'
Similar sentiments are often invoked by those who defend the continued public
presence of Confederate monuments or Confederate imagery at a national level. For
example, shortly after the 2017 violence arising out of the racist demonstrations in
Charlottesville, Virginia, President Trump noted on Twitter that "the beauty that is
being taken out of our cities, towns and parks will be greatly missed" and that it was
"[s]ad to see the history and culture of our great country being ripped apart with the
8
removal of our beautiful statues and monuments."' Still more recently, former South
Carolina Governor and then Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley claimed
that public displays of the Confederate flag had long represented "service, sacrifice[,]
and heritage" before being hijacked by recent'violent events. 19
These views are out of step with the conclusions drawn by many artists,

[https://penna.cc/C6PW-8QCF] (including an image of the relevant side of the Castleman monument
memorial plaque).

5 See Sarah Ladd, Arts Group FilesAppeal to FightRemoval of Castleman Statue in Cherokee Triangle,

COURIER J. (June 10, 2019, 5:28 PM), https://www.courier-joumal.com/story/news/loca/2019/06/1 0/louisville(quoting
[https://perma.ec/X69C-AYTV]
arts-group-appeals-removal-castleman-statue/1406878001/
representatives of the Friends of Louisville Public Art and the Louisville Historic League, who have litigated to
prevent removal of the monument, arguing that the statue should not be removed because it is a neighborhood
and city "landmark and not just a statue").
"6See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 10 (quoting, inter alia, a Louisville resident who lives directly next
to the Castleman monument and argues that "[t]he statue has always been something that I've appreciated
living beside"),
7 See Sarah Rankin, Democrats' Wins Could Help Bring Down ConftderateStatues, ASSOCIATED PRESS

(Nov. 12, 2019), https://apnews.com/efd5dl64a4c44bb4a28d346a3d920832 [https://perma.cc/272P-TPRT]
(quoting, inter alia, B. Frank Earnest, the "heritage defense coordinator" for the Virginia division of the Sons of
Confederate Veterans, regarding his organization's "adamant" opposition to the removal of any Confederate
monuments, whether on Monument Avenue or elsewhere in Virginia).
" David Nakamura, Trump Mourns Loss of 'Beautiful Statues and Monuments' in Wake
of Charlottesville Rally over Robert E. Lee Statue, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2017, 9:44 AM),

https://www washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/08/17/tnump-moums-loss-of-beautiful-statues[https://perma.cc/MT5N-KTAQ]
and-monuments-in-wake-of-charlottesville-rally-over-robert-c-lee-statue!
(providing images of President Trump's relevant tweets on August 17, 2017).
" Aimee Orti,, Nikki Ilaley's Confederate Flag Comments Spark Backlash, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7,2019),

[https://perma.cc/4HDD-B3E9]
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/07/us/Nikki-laley-confederate-flag.html
(quoting and providing transcripts of then Ambassador Haley's remarks about the public display of the
Confederate flag).
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historians, and legal academics who have rejected these and other similar claims of
merit associated with most Confederate monuments in public places."° For example,
contrary to President Trump's views, many art historians and critics have concluded
21
that there are very few Confederate monuments of any significant aesthetic value.
In part this is because of the nature of their construction: many Confederate
monuments were essentially mass-produced, 22 with little connection to their
23
ostensible subjects and, often, even less deliberation about their physical setting.
Historians have been similarly scathing about the gauzy invocation of an
unspecified "heritage," "sacrifice," or "service" that is often invoked to defend the
retention of monuments. 24 Contrary to such claims, most historians argue that the
record is quite clear about what most Confederate monuments were meant to
celebrate: as the American Historical Association recently concluded, most of these
monuments were created to support the initiation or retention of legal segregation,
and for the most part these monuments were designed and sited to intimidate African
Americans and reinforce their political disenfranchisement after Reconstruction.25
Of course, recognizing the poverty and ultimate incoherence of arguments in favor
of most Confederate monuments in public places is nothing new in American life.
For example, almost ninety years ago W.E.B. Du Bois pointed out that it strained the
limits of human credulity and "ingenuity" to see Confederate monuments dedicated
21 See Bray, supra note 9, at 15 16 (gathering samples of academic criticism of Confederate
monuments in public places from across academic disciplines); see aso SANFORD LEVINSON, WRrr FFN
IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHlANGING SOCIETIES 96 97 (2d ed. 2018) (gathering legal and
non-legal sources and concluding that "[d]ecent people should, I think, be repelled by a political system
that leads to" many recent and contemporary displays of Confederate imagery).
" See Tear Down the Confederate Monuments But What Newt? 12 Art istoriansand Scholars on
the Way Forward, ARTNET NEWS (Aug. 23, 2017), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/confederatemonuments-experts- 1058411 [https://perma.cc/7FM4-7CW6].
22 See, e.g., Marc Fisher, Why Those Confederate Soldier Statues Look a Lot Like Their Union
Counterparts, WASi. POST (Aug. 18, 2017, 6:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/whythose-confederate-soldier-statues-look-a-lot-like-their-union-counterparts/2017/08/18/cefcclbc-83941 le7-ab27-la2lae006ab story.html [https://perma.cc/SG77-SVPW] (describing how New England
monument companies sold identical statues to towns and citizens' groups on both sides of the Civil War
divide, and providing sample images of near-identical Union and Confederate Civil War monuments).
1 See Associated Press, Connecticut Was Home to Leading Manufacturer of civil War Monuments, NIW
IAVEN REG. (Apr. 18, 2015, 12 58 PM), https://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/Connecticut-washome-to-leading-manufacturer-of- 11355708.php [https:/perma.cc/D3AI I-CGBW]. As the sources cited above
make clear, the Castleman monument and the Monument Avenue monuments are exceptions that prove the
rule they were not mass-produced, and there are some who continue to defend their aesthetic value. See sources
cited supra notes 3 17.
For a thoughtful exploration of under-examined potential legal issues related to the site-specificity, or lack
thereof, for these mass-produced monuments, see Brian Frye, Moral Rights & Confederate Monuments, FAC.
LOUNGE (Aug. 21, 2017, 12:18 AM), https://www.theficultylounge.org/2017/08/moral-rights-confederatcstatutes.html [https://perma.cc/Y3B3-J92T].
24See supra notes 17 19 and accompanying text.
25 Statement on Confiderate Monuments, AM. I1ST.ASS'N (Aug. 2017), https://www.historians.org/newsand-advocacy/aba-advocacy/aha-statement-on-confederate-monuments [https://perma.cc/ZW9R-8V3X]. For
an accessible and thorough short summary and comprehensive survey of Confederate monuments in this country,
including a record of the dates of their creation and the relationship between periods of intense Confederate
monument creation and the end of Reconstruction, the rise of Jim Crow, and the massive resistance to integration,
see generally Whose Heritage? Public Svnibols q the Conlederacy, S, PovERTY L. CTR. (Feb I. 2019).
https://www.splcenter.org/20190201/whose-heritage-public-symbols-confederacy [https://perma.cc/WZF8-LK38].
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to the "Fight[] for Liberty," when the "plain truth" of these monuments is that they
26
commemorate the struggle "to Perpetuate Human Slavery."
But while their views are out of step with the conclusions of many professional
historians and other experts, President Trump and then Ambassador Haley's
conclusions about the positive value of at least some Confederate imagery and public
monuments are broadly shared by many-and not just in Kentucky and Virginia. In
recent years, polls and surveys have repeatedly shown that retaining monuments to
the Confederacy and specific Confederate figures in public spaces still attracts
27
Support for these
substantial support from Americans across the country.
monuments is not uniform across the country: in some areas, local majorities strongly
8
oppose keeping and strongly support removing local monuments.
More specifically, in relatively large and diverse cities and in university towns,
opposition to Confederate monuments is relatively strong; however, in rural,
exurban, and some suburban areas, support for keeping Confederate monuments
tends to be higher. 9 This strong geographic split in opinions on Confederate
monuments makes sense if it is understood as part of a larger cultural divide in
America between rural and urban places.30 One reason why Confederate monument
conflicts have become so heated and prominent in recent years is because they are
almost uniquely effective in evoking this larger divide."
The conflict over Confederate monuments in public spaces is, therefore, part of
a larger trend in American life. And in addition to the clash between these values in
the public square, conflicts over all sorts of monuments in America have become
particularly fraught in recent years because of the framework of legal protections for
American monuments that has grown up in the last century. For much of the

"6 W.EB. Du Bois, Postscript, 40 CRISIS 278, 279 (1931) (condemning the rash of Confederate
monuments that had spread across the country as "awful things" intertwined with the emergence of Jim
Crow and the "extraordinary" "custom of murder").
27 See, e.g., Bray, supra note 9, at 5 6, 1 1 (gathering additional recent polling sources reflecting
widespread support for retaining Confederate monuments in public or visible private spaces); Christopher
Ingraham, On Confederate Monuments, the Public Stands with Trump, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2017,

2
11:01 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/ 017/08/17/on-confederate-monumentspolls and suggesting that a
(surveying
the-public-stands-with-trump/ [https:/perma.cc/734Q-JP8E]
majority of the public supports President Trump's view that it is "sad to see the ... removal of our beautiful

statues and monuments"); see also Elon Poll--Confederate Statues and Monuments, ELON U. (Nov. 20,

[https//peirma.cc/GM63elon.edu/u!elon-poll/elon-poll-confederate-statues-and-monuments
2019),
DUY4] (noting that in late 2019, 65% of surveyed North Carolina residents favor keeping Confederate
monuments on public, government-owned property).
21

Compare, e.g., Seth McLaughlin, Confederate HeritageStands Strong in Parts of'Rural Virginia,

WASH. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/oct/I 5/confederate-statuesstill-stand-in-rural-virginia! [https://perma.cc/511UZ-NM96] (describing the rural side of the rural-urban
divide on Confederate monuments in Virginia), with, e.g., Antonio Olivo, After Charlottesville, Va.
Democrats See Opening to Change 114-Year-Old Monuments Law, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2017),

https://www.washingtonpost,com/local/de-politics/after-charlottesville-va-democrats-see-opening-tochange- 114-year-old-monuments-law/2017/08/25/5e97e766-880e- 1 e7-a94f-3139abce39f5 story.hitml
[https://perma.cc/RJ9V-F2YX] (describing the urban side of the rural-urban divide on monuments in
Virginia).
'9 Bray, supra note 9, at 5 6.
31

Id. at 5 -7.

31

Id
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country's history, American attitudes about monuments were generally skeptical,
and, as a result, American laws about protecting monuments were much less robust

than they are today.12 But in the last century or so--in roughly the time that the
statues examined in this article have grown up-American landscapes and cityscapes
have filled up with a variety of monuments, and the Amrerican lawscape has grown
heavy with a number of statutes that seek to protect these new monuments.33
In the menagerie of American monument-protection laws, one species of
legislation is particularly important for understanding conflicts over Confederate
monuments: namely, the statutes passed in several states in order to protect
already-existing Confederate monuments from removal or alteration. 34 Following
Richard Schragger's work discussing the attacks in Charlottesville,3" these laws will
be referred to here as "statue statutes." Many of the statue statutes are of relatively

recent vintage, 36 but the original statue statute dates back to the beginning of the 20th
century 37-a time when American attitudes towards monuments in general were
changing, and a time when other monument-protection laws were also emerging.38
Discerning the intent behind both the statue statutes and the monuments they seek to

protect is of more than academic interest-litigation over efforts to remove or alter
Confederate monuments in states with such statutes often hinges on these issues.
The pending litigation at the heart of the recent violent conflict in Charlottesville
provides an excellent example of the importance of such questions of intent to
contemporary legal conflicts over Confederate monuments. Although these issues
may be revisited or reframed on appeal, in this litigation the Virginia circuit court's
orders granting the plaintiff monument defenders' motions for summary judgment
were necessarily based on that court's conclusions about the purpose of both the

monuments at issue and the legislative intent behind the relevant statute.
More specifically, the Virginia court's decision in favor of the Charlottesville
monuments' defenders was based in large part on its holding that the primary purpose
of the monuments at issue was to honor the Civil War military service of the
2 See Bray, supra note 2, at 14 15, 17 19 (discussing the dearth of monuments in America and the
skepticism about American monuments that emerged during the Revolution and persisted through nch
of the nineteenth century).
1 Id. at 14, 26 27.
" Statue statutes have been enacted in the following eight states: Virginia, Tennessee, Alabama,
Georgia, North Carolina, Mississippi, Kentucky, and South Carolina, and they have been considered in
several other states. See Bray, surn-a note 9, at 20-44 (discussing each in detail). Of course, as the example
of Monument Avenue which is a National Historic Landmark shows, other laws can protect
Confederate monuments. For a broader discussion of the relationship between statue statutes and the
National Historic Preservation Act, see Bray, supra note 2, at 32 48.
" Richard C. Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade a City, 104 VA. L. Rtv. ONLINE 58,63 (2018).
3 Bray, supra note 9, at 27 44 (discussing the relatively recent statue statutes in detail).
37 The first version of what this Article refers to as Virginia's statue statute dates back to 1904 Act
of Feb. 19, 1904, ch. 29. 1904 Va, Acts 62. The current version of Virginia's statue statute much
amended since 1904- is codified at VA. COD'i ANN. § 15.2-1812 (2019). In addition to this "general"
statue statute, which purports to protect all Confederate monuments throughout the state, Virginia's
legislature passed some earlier legislation specifically authorizing and, at times, protecting specific
Confederate monuments throughout the state. See generally Va. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 17-032 (Aug, 25,
2017) (discussing same). For more detail on the evolution and recent state of Virginia's state laws
protecting Confederate monuments, see Bray, supra note 9. at 23 27.
38Bray, supra note 2, at 17 26.
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monuments' subjects,39 rather than the narratives of white supremacy and the myth
of the Lost Cause identified by many experts.4" Similarly, the court's ruling in favor
of the plaintiff monument defenders was driven by its conclusion that the racist intent
identified by the defendants and so many historians should not be attributed to the
Virginia statue statute.4" In other words, the most significant pending litigation over
the statue statutes to date has boiled down to the basic questions represented in the
broader public debate about these monuments: what, exactly, are the statue statutes
supposed to protect, what were the monuments they protect supposed to
memorialize, and what have these monuments come to commemorate today?
Recent litigation over a Confederate monument in Birmingham, Alabama
provides another good example of the importance in recent monument litigation of
basic questions about the alleged purpose behind Confederate monuments and the
intent behind the statue statutes that protect these monuments. As in the
Charlottesville litigation, in the Birmingham litigation the Alabama circuit court's
ruling also was based on that court's conclusions about the purpose of both the
monuments at issue and the legislative intent behind the relevant statute--although,
unlike the Virginia court, the Alabama circuit court ruled in favor of the city and
42
against the Birmingham monument's defenders.
More specifically, citing the Supreme Court's reasoning in PleasantGrove City
v. Summum,43 the Alabama circuit court noted that the messaging and purpose behind
a monument "may change over time," and that in the case of the monument at issue
in Birmingham, an overwhelming majority of the city's residents are presently
"repulsed" by the monument's association with "racially-motivated violence" and
"white supremacy."4 4 In addition, the circuit court noted that the Alabama statute at
" See Letter Ruling from Richard E, Moore, Judge, Sixteenth Judicial Court, Commonwealth of
Virginia, to Counsel in Payne v. City of Charlottesville 4-5 (Apr 25, 2019) [hereinafter Payne Letter

Ruling] (rejecting defendants' argument that the statues were designed to reinforce the post-war "Lost
Cause" narrative or notions of white supremacy, and concluding instead that the monuments were
primarily designed to "honor[] these two men as generals in the Civil War and the battles they fought in").
41 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text; see also Richard Schragger, Opinion, It's
the
City s Right

to

Remove

Confederate Monuments,

RICI.

TIMiS-DISPATCH

(Mar.

3,

2019),

https://www.richmond com/opinion/columnists/richard-schragger-column-it-s-the-city-s-rightto/article 81c15f53-1805-59d6-9 1ff-c4816feIe5e6.html [https://perma.cc/C4G9-LKJX] (referring to an
"eye-opening" brief filed by the Charlottesville City Council in Payne v. City ofCharlottesvillethat "catalogs
in detail how the Lee and Jackson statues are not war memorials at all, but rather monuments to white
supremacy").
41 See Payne Letter Ruling, supranote 39, at 4 5; see also Shannon Van Sant, Judge Blocs Removal of
Confederate Statue That Sparked Charlottesville Protest, NPR (Sept. 14, 2019, 6:40 PM),

https://www.npr.org/2019/09/1 4/760876494/judge-blocks-removal-of-confederate-statue-that-sparkedcharlottesville-protest [https://perma.cc/WAU3-57CC] (quoting the judge's bench ruling that "I don't think
I can infer that [the Virginia statue statute] was intended to be racist," because even though racism was
"[c]ertainly" part of the original drafters' mindset, "we should not judge the current law by that intent").
42 Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at 5 6, 9-10, State v. City of Birmingham, No.
01 -CV-2017-903426.00 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 2019), rev'd, No. 1180342, 2019 Ala. LEXIS 132 (Ala.
Nov. 27, 2019); cf Order: Declaratory Judgment, Payne v. City of Charlottesville, No. CL 17-145 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 2019) (granting in part plaintiff monument defenders' request for a declaratory judgment
based on the letter ruling and bench ruling discussed supra at notes 39 and 41 and accompanying text).
43 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
" Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 42, at 3, 5 6 (quoting PleasantGrove
City, 555 U.S, at 477).
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issue was not an anodyne defense of military heritage but rather an impermissible
attempt to "forc[e] the City to speak in favor of the Confederacy and its values,"
45
which violated constitutional protections for local government's speech.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the circuit court's decision,
upholding Alabama's statue statute against Biningham's constitutional challenge,
and remanding to the circuit court with instructions to impose a fine upon
Birmingham for covering up the monument at issue with a plywood screen.46 The
Supreme Court of Alabama spent little time analyzing the messaging associated with
the monument at issue because it rejected the reasoning of the circuit court, based on
Pleasant Grove and related cases, that Birmingham's local government had
expressive rights that could be violated by the statue statute.4 v But even though the
Supreme Court of Alabama specifically rejected the arguments about local
government speech rights advanced by Birmingham and adopted by the Alabama
circuit court, it was still forced to analyze whether the city's actions changed the
meaning associated with the monument and whether the original and altered
48
meanings were intended to be protected by the statue statute.
In sum, the central issues for the courts in both the Birmingham litigation and the
Charlottesville litigation have boiled down to the basic questions represented in the
broader public debate about these monuments: what, exactly, are the statue statutes
supposed to protect, what were the monuments they protect supposed to
memorialize, and what do these monuments commemorate today? On the one hand,
in the courts as well as in the popular press, monument defenders argue that the statue
statutes and the monuments they protect are motivated by respect for a sense of
vaguely defined heritage and civic beautification and for military service to a country
that no longer exists and was at war with their own.49 On the other hand, monument
critics argue that most Confederate monuments were designed to perpetuate a legacy
of discrimination and violence, and that the statue statutes that protect these
monuments are infected with the same contagion.' But while monument critics may
have the weight of non-legal expertise on their side, to date they have made relatively
little headway in swaying public opinion, and as the examples above show the results
of recent litigation have been uneven at best."'
" Id. at6 7
16 State v. City of Birmingham, No. 1180342, 2019 Ala. LEXIS 132, at *3, 37 38 (Ala. Nov. 27, 2019).
17See id. at * 15 30 (concluding that the Alabama circuit court erred in holding that Birmingham had
rights to free speech, equal protection, and due process as against the state of Alabama that could be
infringed by the statue statute).
For reviews of the free speech, equal protection, and due process arguments raised in this litigation
and elsewhere, as well as a review of other constitutional arguments that have been made or might be
made against statue statutes, see generally Bray, supra note 9, at 17 20, and Alexander Tsesis, The
Problem qf Conoederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment Approach, 75 TiM P. L. Rv. 539 (2002).
48See City o/fBirmingham, 2019 Ala. LEXIS 132, at *4 5 (reviewing the statue statute in detail and
concluding that the monument as screened by plywood "memorializes nothing" rather than the historical
"military service" to the Confederacy that is both protected by the statue statute and which the Alabama
Supreme Court identified as the monument's intended purpose).
49See supra notes 15 19, 27 28 and accompanying text.
5"See supra notes 25 26, 40, 42 44 and accompanying text.
51 See supra notes 39 48 and accompanying text. But see Sons of Confederate Veterans v. City of
Memphis, No. M2018-01096-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 2355332, at *9 (Tenn. Ct+ App. June 4, 2019)
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Other work has argued that our contemporary debates about American
monuments and American monument law has been fractured in problematic ways,
with too little attention paid to common themes and arguments that recur across
52
different types of monuments and monument-protection laws. This tunnel vision is
part of the problem with the current debate about the statue statutes that protect
Confederate monuments in public spaces. Because these monuments and the laws
that protect them are so often considered in isolation, and because the debate about
them so frequently evokes a wider clash of fundamental values embedded in
American law and public life, 53 debates over recent Confederate monument
controversies have changed few minds-notwithstanding the overwhelmingly
one-sided nature of the historical record about both monuments and statutes alike.
Opponents of the continued presence of Confederate monuments in public spaces
are right to point out the legacy of discrimination and violence that so many of these
monuments embody, 54 and President Trump, former Ambassador Haley, and the
state and local supporters of many such monuments are wrong to minimize or ignore
this association." These are the most important facts about both Confederate
monuments and the statutes that protect them, and any argument against either the
monuments themselves or the statue statutes ought to reckon with their central
importance. But these arguments have not, to date, won the day. Perhaps, as some
have suggested, this is because neither President Trump nor his supporters nor many
defenders of Confederate monuments and the statue statutes that protect them are
professional historians, whereas the argument against these monuments and statutes
depends too much on expert opinion. 6 Or perhaps it is because once one has
committed to defending the statue statutes or the Confederate monuments they
protect, then it becomes too difficult-too dissonant-to easily accept the racially
discriminatory and exclusionary messages historically associated with these laws
and memorials.57 Whatever the reasons, it behooves opponents of Confederate
monuments and the statue statutes that protect them to look for new arguments-not
to replace the central arguments outlined above; for that would be offensive and
obscure important truths-but to supplement them. To that end, it may be easier to
convince people that the statue statutes are inadequate compared to other
monument-protection laws, and that the monuments they seek to safeguard are
undeserving of protection, when both are compared to other American monuments
(approving the City of Memphis's attempts to remove Confederate monuments as consistent with the
state's statue statute). For a longer discussion of the Memphis monuments, the Tennessee statue statute,
and the related litigation referred to here, see, for example, Bray, supra note 9, at 22-23, 27-31, 45-46,
50, and Bray, supra note 2, at 29-32, 47.
12 See Bray, supra note 2, at 12- 14 (arguing that American monument laws and scholarship about
American monument laws have too often been considered in isolation). But see generally LEVINSON,
supra note 20 (providing a comprehensive and magisterial review of monument law and monument
conflicts across various legal cultures).
53See supra notes 26- 30 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 25 26, 40 42, 44 and accompanying text.
5 See supra notes 15 19, 27 28 and accompanying text.
5 See Ingraham, supranote 27.
s See Bray, supra note 2, at 59 60 (concluding that these facts about the statue statutes and the
monuments they protect are "not easy for everyone to accept," regardless of their truth).

2019-2020

FROM 'WONDERFUL GRANDEUR' TO 'AWFUL TmiNGS'

595

and American monument-protection laws.
The federal Antiquities Act of 1906. 5' and the national monuments that it
protects, provide a useful ground for comparison. The Antiquities Act is no stranger
to controversy-the statute and the national monuments it protects have been
subjected to extended scrutiny and criticism almost since the Act's inception. 59
Criticism of the Antiquities Act has endured into the present, as some recently
proclaimed national monuments have produced intense national controversies,'"
with local opposition nearly as intense as that created by some Confederate
monuments protected by statue statutes. 61 But while the Antiquities Act has some
immediate similarities to the statue statutes, it is also dramatically different in
important and fundamental ways.12 And as the remainder of this Article will show,
the differences between the Antiquities Act and the statue statutes can help to
illuminate some of the shortcomings of the latter in ways that in turn may help to
erode the arguments that continue to be advanced by Confederate monument
defenders.
The remainder of this Article explores these areas of comparison and contrast
between the Antiquities Act and the statue statutes. Part I reviews the Antiquities Act
and its evolution, focusing on the values that the statute has come to protect, as well
as the widespread national and regional popularity of both the Act itself and the
national monuments it protects. Part I also reviews the local opposition to new
monuments that often arises when presidents invoke the Antiquities Act, focusing on
the ways in which decisions about monuments taken pursuant to the Antiquities Act
can seem arbitrary and unjustified to local communities that do not want to live near
new national monuments-much as the statue statutes can seem arbitrary and
unjustified to local communities that wish to get rid of their own Confederate
monuments.
Next, Part II critically compares the statue statutes to the Antiquities Act. In
particular, Section I1.A highlights the ways in which the Antiquities Act has evolved
in practice in recent decades, with monument designation processes that involve far
more local, statewide, and regional consultation than in the first half of the twentieth
century, and far more local consultation than the statue statutes provide. Section lI.A
also reviews a number of national monument proclamations made pursuant to the
Antiquities Act in recent decades, taking note of how much more specific and
detailed these proclamations are than those from fhe first half of the twentieth
18 Antiquities Act of 1906, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (codified at 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2018)).
" See Mark Squillacc, The Monumental Legay ojthe Antiquities Act qf 1906, 37 GA. L. RiV. 473,
489 99 (2003) (discussing early controversies over the Antiquities Act from the time of President
Theodore Roosevelt to Franklin Roosevelt).
60Katy Steinmetz, Donald Trump
ts
Move to Shrink Two National Monuments Sets Stagefor Hattle
Over 111-Year-Old Law, TiMi (Dec. 5, 2017, 1:28 PM), https://time.com/5047904/bcars-ears-grandstaircase-trump-shrinks/ [https://pcrma.cc/67CR-YRSF].
" See, e.g.,
Larry D. Curtis, Bearw Ears NationalMonument Designatedby PresidentObama in Utah,
2KUTV (Dec. 28, 2016), kutv.com/news/local/bears-ears-national-monument-designated-by-presidentobama [https://perma.ec/3QQM-AWNM] (quoting state and federal legislators from Utah who argued
that the Bears Ears proclamation was an act of "tyranny" by a "dictator" that represented "an attack on an
entire way of life").
62Bray, supra note 2, at 59 60.
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century, and pointing out how many of these new monuments seek to serve the
aesthetic, historical, cultural, and social values often invoked by defenders of the
statue statutes and Confederate monuments. Finally, Section ILB turns to the statue
statutes and the monuments they protect, showing how both fail to serve the
aesthetic, historical, cultural, and social values invoked by their defenders and
implemented by the Antiquities Act and many relatively new national monuments.
I, THE ANTIQUITIES ACT AND THE HISTORY OF LOCAL
OPPOSITION TO NEW NATIONAL MONUMENTS

As noted above, the Antiquities Act and the national monuments created pursuant
to the Act have been lightning rods for controversy for over a century-almost since
63
the statute was enacted and the first national monuments proclaimed. But while the
Antiquities Act and national monuments have always been a flashpoint in the larger
64
both the Antiquities Act and
history of American conflicts over monuments,
national monuments, in general, enjoy relatively widespread popularity and
esteem.65 And despite frequent local opposition to specific monuments, presidential
proclamations establishing national monuments pursuant to the Antiquities Act have
rarely been revised by Congress; moreover, many of the national monuments now
thought to be the most significant and valuable were the most controversial, at least
66
at the local level, when they were first created.
Indeed, some of the most bitter local opponents to new national monuments later
concede that the Antiquities Act generally and the new monuments specifically have
worked out for the best, providing opportunities for local economic growth while
67
preserving unique resources for the benefit of the entire nation. For example, the
Jackson Hole National Monument proclaimed by President Franklin Roosevelt was
one of the most controversial monuments designated under the Antiquities Act-so
6
controversial, in fact, that it led to one of the few amendments to the statute itself. "
Yet decades after the monument was proclaimed, many of its once-bitter local
opponents, like Wyoming Senators Clifford Hansen and Alan Simpson, readily
admitted that their past opposition had been a mistake and acknowledged that the

" See, e.g-, James R. Rasband, Utah's GrandStaircase:The Right Path to Wilderness Preseraation?,70 U.

COt O. L, REV. 483, 490 92 (1999) (noting the recurring and "familiar" patterns of resentment, conflict, and
approval that frequently recur around national monuments); supra text accompanying notes 59 61.
64 See, e.g., Louise Liston, Sustaining Traditional Community Values, 21 J. LAND RESOURCES &

ENVTL. L, 585, 585 (2001) (describing the "destructive" local effects associated with many monument
designations); Curtis, supra note 61.
65

See JAMES RASBAND ET AL, NATURAl. RESOURCES LAW & POLICY 687 (3d ed. 2016) (noting that

"presidential proclamation of monuments... has often generated public outcry" but that the controversies have
"generally been limited to directly affected communities and [have] been relatively short-lived" because so many
of those national monuments are now recognized as among the nation's greatest treasures).
66 Squillace, supranote 59, at 550, 581 82.
", E.g_, id. at 498 n, 159 (quoting Wyoming Senators Clifford Hansen and Alan Simpson, who initially
opposed the Jackson Hole National Monument, but who later admitted that their opposition had been a
mistake and that the monument had been a great boon locally as well as to the nation).
68 Id. at 498; see also infra note 79 (describing 54 US.C. § 320301 (d)),
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monument had been a great boon locally as well as to the nation.69

As a result, both the Antiquities Act and the national monuments it protects have
been popular across the country for at least the past several decades. 7o'These numbers

may be skewed by relative ignorance about what the Antiquities Act actually does, 7"
and because the very term "national monuments" may generate vaguely positive
associations leading to broad but shallow polling support among members of the

public. And it is also true that conflicts over the Antiquities Act and new monuments
tend to break along a rural-urban divide similar to that found in debates over

Confederate monuments,72 although in this context monument supporters and

opponents tend to find themselves on opposite sides of our great national divide. But
support for the Antiquities Act and national monuments remains strong even in states
that are home to some of the most intense local opposition to recent monument
designations.73 For example, substantial majorities in some of the states most
impacted by recent monument proclamations describe national monuments as

economically

beneficial, national treasures, and important sites for future

generations to learn about the country's "history and heritage" 74-terms

that are

obviously very similar to those used by Confederate monument defenders in other
contexts. 75
To appreciate the enduring popularity of the Antiquities Act and the national

monuments it has helped create, as well as the recurring cycles of regional and local
opposition that many new monuments engender, it is necessary to step back and look
at the Act's origins and relevant text. For all the controversy it has engendered and
all the land it has protected, the substantive text of the Antiquities Act is extremely
short. Without much elaboration, in the Antiquities Act Congress delegates to the
President the discretionary power to "declare by public proclamation historic
landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or

6, Squillace, supra note 59, at 498 n. 159 (citing Candy Moulton, National Monuments? Not in Wyoming,

CASPER STARTRIB., Jan. 1,2001, at A1, and quoting Senators Hansen and Simpson from same).
7( Albert C. Lin, Clinton s National Monuments: A Democrat's Undemocratic Acts?, 29 EcoiLOGY
L.Q. 707, 737 (2002) (noting the widespread national popularity of presidential monument proclamations
despite "regional pockets of intense opposition"),
" Editorial, Protecting Public Lands Isn't 'Abuse,' BALT. SUN (May 10, 2017, 2:29 PM),
https://www.baltimorcsun.com/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-montments-2017051 0-story.html
[https://penna.cc/QK94-A7UN] (noting that "[m]ost Americans probably haven't heard of the Antiquities Act").
'2 See supra notes 27 30 and accompanying text (discussing the broader rural-urban divide and how
it relates to debates over Confederate monuments and the laws that protect them).
73See, e.g., Press Release, Colorado College State of the Rockies Project, 8th Annual Conservation
in the West Poll Finds Strong Support for
Protecting Land and Water; Voters Reject National Monument Attacks (Jan. 25, 2018) (on file with
Colorado College) [hereinafter Colorado College Press Release] (noting that inhabitants of Rocky
Mountain states "hold national monuments in especially high regard"); see also Laura Lundquist, Western
Voters Say They Want Protection, Expansion /' Public Lands, MISSOULA CURRENT (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://www.missoulacurrent.com/outdoors/2019/I O/western-public-lands!
[https://perma.ec/777QRB6Y] (reviewing recent polling in western states that indicated, inter alia, that "[albout 60 percent of
voters [in western states] said they support creating new national parks and monuments").
74 Colorado College Press Release, supra note 73 (noting that majorities of over 80% in the
poll's
sampled respondents described national monuments in these terms).
75See supra text accompanying notes 15 19.
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6
scientific interest" on federal land "to be national monuments." The Act also
provides that the President may, as part of the monument designation process,
"reserve parcels of land as a part of the national monuments," restricting the uses to
which such parcels of federal land might otherwise be subjected in order to protect
77
the resources associated with the designated monument. In reserving such parcels
the smallest area [of land]
"to
of land, the President is supposed to be confined
objects to be protected."78
the
of
management
and
compatible with the proper care
79
And that is essentially the whole of the relevant statutory text : in just a handful
of sentences, the Antiquities Act gives presidents extremely broad discretion to
designate national monuments without having to wait for the sort of specific
congressional authorization that would be required to create a national park--even
though most national monuments are run like national parks and by the National Park
Service.80 In other words, the Antiquities Act gives presidents authority to make an
end run around a hesitant Congress in order to protect potentially valuable historic
or natural resources on federal land that might be compromised before Congress can
act. This is a feature of the statute, not a bug: the Antiquities Act was motivated by
a concern that particularly vulnerable sites of natural or archaeological importance
would be despoiled or looted before Congress could act to protect them with
park-enabling legislation.8 1 In the century-plus since the Act was passed, many
monuments have been proclaimed by presidents shortly before the end of an
administration, as outgoing presidents seek to protect resources by proclamation that
they were unable to protect through congressional legislation-these "midnight"
2
monuments often have attracted particularly intense local opposition.
Although these "midnight" monuments are often particularly controversial,
monuments of all types have triggered intense local and regional opposition almost
83
since the first conflicts after the Antiquities Act was originally passed. In recent
months, the most prominent Antiquities Act controversy has been related to

54 U.S.C. § 32030 1(a) (2018).
ld § 320301(b).
7 id.
7' The above-quoted provisions are essentially, but not literally, the whole of the relevant statutory
text. Another provision of the Antiquities Act expressly authorizes the federal government to acquire and
retain privately owned property that may be necessary for the proper care and management of national
monuments. Id. § 320301(c). Still another provision, added to the Antiquities Act in the 1940s after the
controversy over the Jackson Hole National Monument designated by President Franklin Roosevelt,
prohibits any additional monument designations in Wyoming without express congressional
authorization. Id. § 320301(d); Squillace, supra 59, at 498. For a short summary on the controversy over
the Jackson Hole National Monument, see Squillace, supra note 59, at 495- 99.
" Indeed, many of the most-cherished national parks were originally national monuments, later
converted and expanded into parks by Congress. Squillace, supra note 59, at 488 89.
" See RONALD F. LEE, TIlE ANTIQUITIES ACT OF 1906 47 77 (1970) (providing a detailed history of
the passage and early evolution of the Antiquities Act); see also Bray, supra note 2, at 24 26, 48 50
(discussing the roots of the Antiquities Act in a broader history of American monument law).
" See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 61 (quoting federal and state legislators from Utah who were
particularly incensed about the alleged "midnight" nature of President Obama's final monument
designations).
76

77

" James R. Rasband, Antiquities Act Monuments: The Elgin Marbles of'Our Public Lands?, in TiE
ACT: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGY, PRESERVATION, AND NATURE

ANTIQUITIES

CONSERVATION 137, 137 38 (David Iarmon et al. eds., 2006).
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President Trump's efforts to reduce the size of national monuments originally
designated by President Obama. 4 In December 2017, President Trump issued two
proclamations shrinking national monuments established by Presidents Clinton and

Obama, amounting to "the largest reduction of public-lands protection in [American]
history." 5 Whether or not this reduction of the monuments' size was an appropriate
exercise of presidential authority pursuant to the Antiquities Act has been much

debated,86 and many of the American Indian tribes, environmental groups, and other
organizations supportive of the monuments' original designation are challenging the
87

reductions in court.
The prominence of this recent conflict-the fight over President Trump's
reduction of previously designated national monuments

has obscured what has

traditionally been a far more significant and recurring source of conflict under the
Antiquities Act: namely, the nature and scope of presidential authority to create
national monuments in local communities that will face economic and cultural
changes as a result of increased restrictions on nearby federal land."8
Notwithstanding the national popularity of the Antiquities Act, many who live near
new monuments and feel they have been excluded from the decision-making process
deeply oppose both the statute and the new monuments, at least initially.89
Such sporadic but intense local opposition to the Antiquities Act generally and
new monuments more specifically dates back to the earliest days of the Antiquities
Act: in 1920, the Supreme Court ruled on the first significant challenge to the
90
Antiquities Act in Cameron v. United States,
a challenge that was brought by a
mineral rights-holder and early tourism entrepreneur in the Grand Canyon.9" In
Cameron, the disappointed local challenger argued that President Theodore
Roosevelt's monument designation was unsupported by the Antiquities Act because
it did not contain a particularly specific statement of the canyon's scientific interest,

" See Josh Dawsey & Juliet Eilperin, Trump Shrinks Two ttuge National Monuments in Utah. Drawing
Praiseand Protests, WASf . POST (Dec.4,2017, 8:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumpscales-back-two-huge-national-monuments-in-utah-drawing-praise-and-protcsts/2017/12/04/758c85c6d908-1 e7-b I a8-62589434a58 1 story.html [https://perma.ec/W524-QQZQ].
I5d.
"6See, e.g., BENJAMIN HAYES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45718, THE ANTIQUIlIES ACT: I l STORY,
CURRENT LITIGATION, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR TiE 116TIl CONGRESS 17 29 (2019); John C. Ruple,
The Trump Administration and Lessons Not Learned iom PriorNational Monument Modifications, 43
I1ARV. ENVTi. L. RE.v 1, 74 76 (2019) (concluding that although the Antiquities Act empowers the
President to create national monuments, no such presidential power to revise or eliminate monuments can
be found in the text of the statute, its legislative history, or the history of its application).
" Rachel Frazin, Bears Ears Lawsuit to Proceed,FederalJudgeRules, IhL[ (Oct. 1,2019, 8:32 AM),
https://thehiI1.com/policy/energy-environment/463775-bears-ears-lawsuit-to-proceed-federal-judge-rules
[https://perma.cc/Z7119-1 IFKN] (gathering quotes from litigants after the federal district court denied the
government's motion to dismiss).
" See Bray, supra note 2, at 55 56 (gathering sources and describing how local opponents of new
monuments often feel excluded from the monument-designation process).
" See, e.g., Liston, supra note 64, at 585 (describing her own experience and those of her neighbors,
and quoting a nonagenarian neighbor who stated that "Times have changed here. This is the poorest time
of my life. Before the Monument, people were happier.").
'o252 U.S. 450, 454 55 (1920).
9'See Squillace, su ra note 59, at 490 92, for a good, short summary of the factual background of
Cameron v. United States.
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92
or any of the other enumerated bases for monument designation given in the statute.
Instead, Roosevelt's proclamation stated only that the Grand Canyon was "an object
of unusual scientific interest," as covered in the statutory text, because it is "the
greatest eroded canyon in the United States," without any additional elaboration as
to why its size made it of unusual scientific interest, or any other information as to
93
why preserving the monument would be in the public interest. Implicit in
Cameron's challenge was a question about the size of the monument designation as
well 94 : Roosevelt's proclamation created a national monument of more than 800,000
acres 95-a size potentially incompatible with the Antiquities Act's text, which, as
noted above, directs the President to restrict monuments "to the smallest area [of
land] compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be
protected." 96
But Cameron's challenge was unsuccessful. Notwithstanding the apparent
deviations from the apparent spirit if not the text of the Antiquities Act, the Court in
Cameron concluded that the designation of the Grand Canyon as a national
monument was appropriate. 97 In particular, the Court held that President Roosevelt's
monument designation was appropriate because the Grand Canyon "has attracted
wide attention among explorers and scientists, affords an unexampled field for
geologic study, is regarded as one of the great natural wonders, and annually draws
to its borders thousands of visitors" 98--even though none of these specific reasons
were provided in Roosevelt's proclamation, and some of the reasons, such as the
99
canyon's attraction to visitors, are not supported by the text of the Antiquities Act.
Since Cameron, most presidents from both parties have used the Antiquities Act

92 See Cameron, 252

U.S. at 455.

9 Id. at 455 56 (quoting, without citation, Proclamation No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175 (Jan. 11, 1908)).
President Theodore Roosevelt was not always so terse when it came to the Grand Canyon. Roughly
five years before the monument was proclaimed, on May 6, 1903, Roosevelt gave an address at the Grand
Canyon on a number of topics, among them the importance of preserving the country's great "natural
wonder[s]" including the "absolutely unparalleled" Grand Canyon itself, I PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES
AND STATE PAPERS OE THEODORE ROOSEVELT 369, 370 (1905) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES
OE THEODORE RoOSEVELT]. More specifically, Roosevelt urged his audience not to do anything with the
"great wonder," the "wonderful grandeur, the sublimity, the great loneliness and beauty of the canyon"
besides working "to keep it for your children, your children's children, and for all who come after you, as
one of the great sights which every American if he can travel at all should see." Id. at 370.
Had this address been incorporated into Roosevelt's monument proclamation in 1908, it would not
have seemed out of place with the more recent proclamations discussed in Section I.A. At the same time,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a contemporary American president describing any of the
monuments protected by the statue statutes in such soaring language.
"4See Squillace, supra note 59, at 492 (noting that although the issue was not directly addressed in the
Court's opinion in Cameron v. United States, "the clear implication of the Court's decision was that the size
of the monument was not disqualifying if the 'protected object' was otherwise of 'scientific interest').
95 ld. at 486 n. 70.
96
54 U.S.C. § 320301(b) (2018).
, Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455 56,
Id. at 456.
Compare id. (justifying the monument designation as appropriate under the Antiquities Act), with
Proclamation No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175 (Jan. 11, 1908) (containing no mention of the specific factors
articulated by the Court), and 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2018) (containing no discussion of appeal to visitors
as a potential basis for national monument designation).
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to designate monuments of ever-increasing size including monuments of many
thousands of square miles."" ° And like the Grand Canyon National Monument
proclamation litigated in Cameron, subsequent monuments often have been
designated for stated purposes that have little or no basis in the text of the statute
itself, including but not limited to preserving features of natural beauty or wildlife
conservation."' Like President Theodore Roosevelt's proclamation, in the first
several decades after the Antiquities Act was enacted, presidential monument
proclamations tended to be rather terse, providing little information about the
resources at issue or the specific reasons for their protection as national monuments.
And while subsequent monument proclamations have grown ever longer-a trend
that will be discussed toward the end of Part I below-courts have continued to
approve monument designations that have only a nodding correspondence with the
stated purposes of the Act or its insistence that land reserved as part of a monument
be confined to the "smallest area" of land compatible with protecting the unique
resources at issue. For example, in Tulare County v. Bush, the D.C. Circuit held that
a "lyrical[]" description of "magnificent groves of towering giant sequoias"' and the
"enormous number of habitats" for wildlife present in a monument designation of
over 325,000 acres was specific enough to satisfy the statutory limits of the

Antiquities Act. 102
The Effigy Mounds National Monument in Iowa, designated in 1949 by President
Truman,") 3 provides a good example of the relative dearth of information and
justification provided in monument proclamations from the first several decades after
the Antiquities Act. Effigy Mounds National Monument protects roughly two
hundred earthen mounds, which usually rise about three feet in height and
occasionally extend hundreds of feet in length, and which were built on bluffs with
scenic views near the Mississippi River between B.C.E. 100 and C.E. 1200. 104 Most

1o0

Antiquities

Act:

Monuments

List,

NAT'L

PARK

SERV.,

https://www.nps.gov/archeology/sites/antiquities/monumentslist.htm
[https://perma.cc/F2ZX-YMAC]
(listing national monuments by the date of their initial creation, and including information about the
presidents who designated or expanded them as well as their size).
101See Bray, supra note 2, at 54 (concluding that "[it is hard to argue that Congress
clearly
intended the expansive interpretation of the Antiquities Act that we live with today, even for those," like
the author, who "believe that most if not all of the monuments so designated have been an invaluable boon
for the nation").
102 Tulare County v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138, 1140 41 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 813
(2003) (quoting Proclamation No.7295, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,095 (Apr. 15, 2000)).
1" Proclamation No. 2860, 14 Fed. Reg. 6541 (Oct. 25, 1949).
104Julie Fenster, Iowa's Earth Sculptures, N.Y. TIMiEs, Nov. 14, 1993, at 22, 34.
The Effigy Mounds monument has been much in the news in recent years for unfortunate reasons
having little to do with its importance to American history and Native American culture. In 20)15, the
former superintendent of the monument signed a plea deal that acknowledged his theft of human remains
from the park, and the National Park Service prepared a report detailing serious mismanagement and a
"decade of dysfunction," illegal construction, and damage to the mounds for which the monument was
established in the first place. Adam Burke, New Site to Be Examined at Effigy Moundi This Summer,
LitTILE VILLAGEt MAG.(May 19, 2016), https://littlcvillagemag.com/ncw-site-to-be-examined-at-effigymounds-this-summer/ [https://perma.cc/6V9A-CFFF]; see also Associated Press, National Park Service
Buries Report on E.1figy Mounds Scandal, Dm MOINtiS RtIG. (Aug. 3, 2015, 3:56 PM),
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/life/2015/08/03/national-park-service-buries-report -effigy-
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of the mounds-well over a hundred of them-are conical or linear in their structure,
but over two dozen of the mounds were built in the shape of enormous bears and
birds, 1 The mounds at the monument, which were usually, but not always, used as
burial sites, are representative of hundreds more built throughout the upper Midwest,
many of which were destroyed in the 20th century to make way for cornfields or
utility lines.' 06
The preceding three sentences do scant justice to the site or its importance to
American history and present culture.1 0 7 But they are longer and provide
substantially more detail about the monument than the substantive portions of
President Truman's monument proclamation, which noted simply that the monument
would protect "earth mounds ...

[that] are of great scientific interest because of the

variety of their forms," including "animal effigy, bird effigy, conical, and linear
types, illustrative of a significant phase of the mound-building culture of the
prehistoric American Indians," all of which were recognized "to be of national
scientific importance" by the Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Sites,
Buildings, and Monuments.'0
Despite this lack of detail, under the standard articulated in Cameron and
developed in subsequent cases like Tulare County, the description of Effigy Mounds
provided in Truman's proclamation was perfectly adequate under the Antiquities
Act. Indeed, at its original size of a little more than a thousand acres, Effigy Mounds
09
is far smaller than many monuments designated in the last century,' which makes
it a far better fit with the guidelines set forth by the text of the Antiquities Act than
many other monuments designated before and since.
In sum, the brevity and lack of detail of the Effigy Mounds proclamation, which
are so typical of monument proclamations in the first half of the twentieth century,
demonstrates how substantial the discretion afforded to presidents is pursuant to the
Antiquities Act. Moreover, as noted above, even when monument designations have
been challenged, courts have largely declined to enforce the statute's guidelines
about potential monuments' substance and size."I 0 These factors have contributed to
the alienation and resentment that many local opponents of new monuments feel, at
least in the initial years after a monument is proclaimed."' Not only do many
mounds-scandal/31073151/ [https://perma.cc/V95B-CTA8] (providing quotes from National Park
Service officials and others about the recent scandals at Effigy Mounds).
"0' Fenster, supra note 104, at 22,
106 Id, at 22, 34.
07 See Bennet Goldstein, Iowa Monument Continues to Recover Stolen Human Remains, DES
MOINES REG. (Sept. 9, 2018, 6:05 PM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/crime-andcourts/2018/09/09/iowas-effigy-mounds-national-monument-continues-recover-stolen-humanremains/1251862002/ [https://perma.cc/WG8F-2QVD] (noting the ongoing affiliation with the site of
almost two dozen federally recognized American Indian tribes); see also Burke, supra note 104 (quoting
William Quackenbush, historic preservation officer for the Ho-Chunk Nation of Wisconsin, regarding his
tribe's ongoing work with the Park Service at Effigy Mounds).
"" Proclamation No. 2860, 14 Fed. Reg. 6541 (Oct. 25, 1949),
9 See Antiquities Act: Monuments List, supra note 100 (listing national monuments by the date of
their initial creation, and including information about the presidents who designated or expanded them as
well as their size).
See supra notes 90 102 and accompanying text.
I

See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
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neighbors of new monuments feel that they lack control over the end result of the
monument designation process, but the end result of the process often appears
12
inconsistent with the guidelines of the governing statute.'
II. A CRITICAL

COMPARISON OF THE STATUE STATUTES TO TIIE ANTIQUITIES ACT

In some ways the Antiquities Act has changed very little since monuments such
as Grand Canyon and Effigy Mounds were designated. The statutory text is little
changed since it was enacted, presidents continue to enjoy broad discretion to
proclaim new monuments, and the Act and the idea of national monuments enjoy
widespread national popularity, all while some new monuments continue to foster
substantial resentment and feelings of disenfranchisement at the local level.' But in
recent decades the monument designation process has evolved in at least two
important ways from the examples of the Grand Canyon and Effigy Mounds outlined
above. First, the process for monument designations have become more
collaborative, open to the public, transparent in terms of the underlying research,
and-at least in some recent instances shaped more by collaboration with local and
regional stakeholders than in the past. And second, monument proclamations
themselves have become more detailed, providing better explanations about the
interests and resources being served.
A. The Evolution ofthe Antiquities Act in Recent Decades
The process of opening up the monument-designation process began in the
1990s-partly in response to some of the criticism associated with the monuments
proclaimed in President Clinton's first term. 14 In particular, Interior Secretary Bruce
Babbitt articulated a new approach to monument designations, beginning by
assigning other federal agencies besides the Park Service authority for overseeing
new monuments."15 The mid- to late-1990s monument-designation process also
became significantly more collaborative than in the past-despite substantial
regional and local opposition, monument designations since this time have tended to
involve consultation opportunities with Congress to see if protective legislation
could be enacted to make presidential proclamations under the Antiquities Act
unnecessary.

1

6

112E.g., Liston, ,supranote 64, at 585 86 (noting how "destructive" it is to local residents "when the
fate of a region is determined by people who do not have to live with the direct results of their decisions,"
who do not take into account local concerns, and whose decisions do not appear to meet the "requirements
imposed by federal law").
113See supra text accompanying notes 61, 82 87,
"4 RASBAND ET AL., supra note 65, at 696 97.
'" E.g., John 1). Leshy, The Babbitt Legacly at the Departmentofthe Interior:A Preliminary View,
31 ENVTL. L. 199, 200, 217 (2001) (describing how the Grand Staircase-Escalante monument was
assigned to the Bureau of Land Management rather than the Park Service, thereby opening a new chapter
in federal land management history); see also RASBANIJ ET AL., supra note 65, at 697 (noting that this
procedural reform has "resulted in legislation protecting several remarkable areas" that otherwise likely
would not have received legislative protection).
11 E.g., Leshy, supra note 115, at 217; see also RASBAND I AL.,
note 65, at 696 97,
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The procedural reforms developed under Secretary Babbitt and President Clinton
also included greater opportunities for meetings between federal officials tasked with
exploring monument designation and local and regional officials as well as members
7
of the public likely to be substantially affected by new monuments." While these
processes are not baked into the statute itself-and perhaps they should be" '-they
have largely been followed and even expanded by many subsequent administrations.
For example, President Obama's approach to the Bears Ears monument involved a
novel approach to monument designation, focusing on participatory stewardship and
collaborative management with local stakeholders rather than exclusion based on
federal control.' 9 As a result, despite the presence of some passionate local and
regional opposition to President Obama's proclamation of Bears Ears as a national
monument, 1202 many and perhaps most residents of the state favored the
designation.' '
In addition to these procedural reforms, in recent decades, presidents of both
parties have issued increasingly detailed proclamations when designating
monuments, which explain what the monument seeks to protect and why in terms far
more detailed than, for example, President Truman's designation of Effigy Mounds
or President Theodore Roosevelt's designation of the Grand Canyon. As with the
procedural reforms discussed above, this shift in monument proclamations began in
earnest in the 1990s-designed in part as a reaction to the controversies that
accompanied some of President Clinton's initial monument designations.1 22 In the
past few decades, presidents of both parties have designated dozens of national
monuments, large and small, with proclamations that explain why the resources at
issue deserve special protection in detail far greater than the proclamations that
created monuments like the Grand Canyon and Effigy Mounds in the first half of the
twentieth century.
65, at 696- 97.
...
See Bray, supra note 2, at 57-60 (arguing for these and other reforms to the Antiquities Act).
"'7 See RASBAND ET AL., supra note

'

See Sarah Krakoff, Public Lands, Conservation, and the Possibility of Justice, 53 HARV.

C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 213, 216 (2018); see also Mathew Gross, Tribes FormallyPresentBears Ears Proposal
to Obama Administration, RtDROCK WILDERNESS (S. Utah Wilderness All., Salt Lake City, Utah),

Autumn/Winter 2015, at 10 11 (describing the years of research and collaboration by the Bears Ears
Inter-Tribal Coalition, which presented President Obama with a monument proposal for the area and urged
him to designate the monument pursuant to the Antiquities Act),
1211See supra notes 61, 82 87 and accompanying text.
121

Thomas Burr, Poll: Most Utahns Favor a Bears Ears National Monument, SALT LAKE

TIRIB. (Aug. 11, 2016, 7:10 PM), https:/archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id-4224034&itype CMSID
[https://perma.cc/2TD5-YQI IG] (noting that in a then-recent poll, 55% of Utahns supported protecting
Bears Ears with a national monument designation).
122 Leshy, supra note 115, at 217 (noting an example of one of President Clinton's monument
designations in the 1990s that was far more detailed and descriptive than its predecessors, carefully
outlining the objects of scientific and historic interest qualifying for protection under the Antiquities Act,
and addressing specific areas of potential local, regional, and national concern).
Although the deliberate shift to longer monument proclamations dates to President Clinton's second
term, some of President Carter's monument proclamations are nearly as detailed as those issued by
Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama, and therefore they also represent departures from the
relatively terse approach seen in the Grand Canyon and Effigy Mounds models discussed above. One
example of President Carter's proclamations will be reviewed briefly. See nfra note 123 and
accompanying text.
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Whether the monuments protected by these newer proclamations are more or less
worthy of protection than their predecessors is not the point. What is relevant here,
for purposes of comparison with the statue statutes, is the specificity and
transparency of the explanations at issue. The monuments of recent decades have
been created by proclamations which, by and large, contain a level of detail that
allows all concerned parties to understand what is being protected and why, even
if-perhaps especially if-the parties do not agree with the decision to create the
monument.
Summarizing the proclamations creating the past two decades of national
monuments is of course beyond the scope of this Article-and many of these
monuments were designed to protect objects of natural scientific interest with
relatively little relevance to the Confederate monuments that are protected by the
statue statutes and examined in this Article. Indeed, the task is too long for this paper
even if one restricts the survey to those monuments from the last few decades with
detailed proclamations that are designed to protect objects or resources of primarily
historical interest. But reviewing a few representative examples of relatively recent
and detailed monument proclamations of primarily historic interest will be useful,
before turning to some of the lessons that can be drawn from a comparison of national
monuments and the Antiquities Act to the statue statutes and the monuments they
protect.
Since the Carter administration, presidents of both parties have designated
dozens of monuments protecting objects or resources of significant historic interest.
As noted above, in recent decades, these monument designations have been carried
out by relatively detailed proclamations, which, unlike monument proclamations
from the first half of the twentieth century, explain in detail what historical resources
are being protected and why they are worthy of protection. These monuments range
across the country, from the thousand-year-old trade routes and pioneer mining
archaeological sites protected by Alaska's Gates of the Arctic National Monument,
proclaimed by President Carter, 123 to the rare wrecks of the specific slave ships
protected in the expansion of the U.S. Virgin Islands' Buck Island Reef National
24
Monument, a monument expansion proclaimed by President Clinton.'1
Such recent and detailed historic national monument proclamations cover the full
sweep of the continent's rich human heritage as well. For example, President
Clinton's proclamation of the Grand Canyon-Parashant National Monument details
the rock art images, quarries, villages, watchtowers, burial sites, trails, camps, pit
houses, and pueblo structures that date back over thousands of years. 25 To take
another example, President Obama's proclamation of the First State National
Monument describes a variety of protected historic properties throughout Delaware
related to Swedish, Finnish, Dutch, and English colonists in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, as well as other protected historic properties significant to the
Revolutionary War and the Underground Railroad.26 And to take an example

...Proclamation
124Proclamation
12 Proclamation
121Proclamation

No.
No.
No.
No.

4617,
7392,
7265,
8944,

43 Fed. Reg. 57043 (Dec. 1, 1978).
66 Fed. Reg 7335 (Jan. 17, 2001).
65 Fed. Reg, 2825 (Jan. 11, 2000).
78 Fed. Reg. 18769 (Mar. 25, 2013)
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drawing on still more recent historical events, President Obama's proclamation of
the Stonewall National Monument describes in detail the protected portions of
Christopher Park in New York City and its decades-old relationship with the 1969
27
Stonewall Uprising specifically and the nation's LGBT history more generally.'
Additional examples of such substantively diverse and richly detailed recent historic
national monument proclamations abound, from President Clinton's proclamation of
the Minidoka Internment National Monument in 2001,128 to President George W.
Bush's proclamation of the African Burial Ground National Monument in 2006,129
to President Obama's proclamation of the Cisar E. Chdvez National Monument in
2012' 30 and the Pullman National Monument in 2015.131
More specifically, there are many examples of such recent and detailed historic
national monument proclamations that are designed to protect a wide range of objects
and resources commemorating the specific military service and heritage that the text
of many of the statue statutes focus upon. For example, President Clinton's
proclamation of the Governors Island National Monument in New York Harbor
details the significance of protected Castle William and Fort Jay, not just in terms of
their significance to American military history but also in terms of their significance
to the history of military design more generally.132 To take another example,
President George W. Bush's proclamation of the World War II Valor in the Pacific
National Monument describes in detail a series of protected sites, some associated
with the Pearl Harbor area, others associated with battle sites or crash landings in the
and internment center for Japanese
Aleutian Islands, as well as the segregation
33
California.'
in
Lake
Tule
at
Americans
Some of these detailed and recent national monuments dedicated to the
country's military heritage focus on specific figures rather than broader events-just
as some of the monuments protected by the statue statutes focus on particular former
Confederates. For example, President Obama's proclamation of the Charles Young
Buffalo Soldiers National Monument uses a detailed description of the life and
military career of Colonel Charles Young, "the highest-ranking African-American
commanding officer in the United States Arny" from 1894 until 1922, a$ a focusing
account of the rich heritage of African-American military
lens to provide a thorough
34
service in America.1

In addition, some of these recent and detailed national monuments dedicated to
the country's military heritage focus on Civil War military history and serviceincluding the lived experience of significant former Confederates. For example,
President Obama's proclamation of the Fort Monroe National Monument describes
in detail the fort's military significance during the Peninsula Campaign and the siege
of Petersburg in the Civil War itself, as well as the fort's importance as the

'2

Proclamation No. 9465, 81 Fed. Reg. 42215 (June 24, 2016).

128 Proclamation No. 7395, 66 Fed. Reg. 7347 (Jan. 17, 2001).

129 Proclamation No. 7984, 71 Fed. Reg. 10793 (Feb. 27, 2006).

Proclamation
Proclamation
132Proclamation
' Proclamation
134 Proclamation
'0
31

No.
No.
No.
No,
No.

8884, 77 Fed. Reg. 62413 (Oct. 8, 2012)).
9233, 80 Fed. Reg. 10315 (Feb. 19, 2015).
7402,66 Fed. Reg. 7855 (Jan. 19, 2001).
8327, 73 Fed. Reg. 75293 (Dec. 5, 2008).
8945, 78 Fed. Reg. 18777 (Mar. 25, 2013).
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imprisonment site of Confederate President Jefferson Davis after the end of the
conflict. 35
Last, although the Antiquities Act does not contain any provision for protecting
resources of aesthetic significance, many of the recent and more detailed monument
proclamations from the past few decades also contain detailed accounts of the
inherent beauty, scenic interest, architectural significance, or artistic importance of
the resources protected by the monument designation. "' A few brief examples from
the sample of monument proclamations already discussed above will suffice:
President Clinton's 2000 proclamation of the Grand Canyon-Parashant National
Monument describes in detail the "spectacular" and "colorful vistas," the "rugged
and beautiful ... canyons," the ways in which certain cliffs "juxtapose the colorful,
lava-capped Precambrian and Paleozoic strata" against various "recent lake beds,
and desert volcanic peaks," and the exposure of "purple, pink, and white shale,
mudstone, and sandstone ... [that] are exposed in Hells Hole"; 37 President Obama's
2013 proclamation of the First State National Monument takes note of the
architectural significance of many of the preserved buildings as well as the bucolic
rural surroundings and greenspace of the protected land; 3t and finally, President
Obama's 2016 proclamation of the Stonewall National Monument takes note of the
significance of George Segal's sculpture, "Gay Liberation," which is protected by
the monumental designation, as well as this statue's aesthetic importance as a focal
point in the plaza of protected Christopher Park.'13 9
B. The Empty Values and Arbitrary Nature of the Statue Statutes
What lessons can the evolution of the Antiquities Act and the shift in the
character of national monument proclamations provide for the debate over statue
statutes and the monuments they protect? As described above, in the last few
decades, the Antiquities Act has evolved, at least in its application, into something
that attempts to incorporate local concerns into the process of national monument
designation and protection. Moreover, in roughly this time period, monument
proclamations pursuant to the Antiquities Act have also changed, becoming far more
detailed and specific about what resources new monuments are supposed to protect,
and why these resources are deserving of protection.

135 Proclamation No. 8750, 76 Fed. Reg. 68625 (Nov. 1,2011).

The Fort Monroe monument is not the only example of a recently proclaimed national monument that
protects objects of historical significance to Civil War history or that celebrate Civil War military service
and heritage. For example, the Governors Island monument proclamation details the site's importance
during the Civil War, and the Stonewall monument proclamation discusses the statue of Civil War General
Philip Sheridan and the memorial plaque honoring Civil War Colonel Ephraim Elmer Ellsworth and the
New York Fire Zouaves that are protected within Christopher Park. Proclamation No. 7402, 66 Fed. Reg.
7855 (Jan. 19, 2001); Proclamation No. 9465, 81 Fed. Reg. 42215 (June 24, 2016).
131See, e g., supra text accompanying note 102 (discussing Tulare County v. Bush, the Grand Sequoia
National Monument proclamation, and the former's holding about the latter's "lyrical[f' description of
"magnificent groves of towering giant sequoias," among other protected resources).
'37 Proclamation No. 7265, 65 Fed. Reg. 2825 (Jan. 11, 2000).
131Proclamation No. 8944, 78 Fed. Reg. 18769 (Mar. 25, 2013).
33 Proclamation No. 9465, 81 Fed. Reg. 42215 (June 24, 2016).
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These changes have worked the Antiquities Act and the national monuments it
protects into something far different than the statue statutes and the monuments they
protect. And in these differences are important lessons for the debates over statue
statutes and Confederate monuments in public spaces, and new arguments for their
abolition and removal. But in order to appreciate these differences, it will be
necessary first to examine some of the similarities between the Antiquities Act and
the statue statutes-similarities that were once far greater in the past. 40
To begin, the statue statutes and the Antiquities Act share common historical
141
the
roots. Although many of the statue statutes are of relatively recent vintage,
142
original version of Virginia's statue statute is much older than those of other states.
Like the Antiquities Act, this oldest statue statute dates back to the turn of the
twentieth century: a time when American attitudes toward public monuments were
in flux, as an old colonial-era skepticism about public memorials was being replaced
by a new monumental enthusiasm and a desire to celebrate rather than reinvent the
past. 43 While one American legislator at the beginning of the nineteenth century
'
and their Revolutionary
proclaimed that "monuments are good for nothing,"144
of King George 111,145
monument
a
down
melted
and
up
torn
happily
had
ancestors
within a few decades many Americans wanted to fill the country up with built civic
monuments to the country's founding generation while preserving great 14natural
wonders and feats of engineering as permanent national monuments as well. 1
The earliest statue statute and the Antiquities Act both reach back to this same
period: the early twentieth century, when attitudes about American monuments had
shifted from skepticism to approval, even enthusiasm, but before America had other
monument-protection laws---indeed, they date back to a period before there were
147
many other laws for either natural or historic conservation and preservation at all.
Both the Antiquities Act and the earliest statue statute also predate the "monument
wars" of the late twentieth century and our own time. 148 So it should not be surprising
that both of these statutes display a nearly unexamined certainty in the positive value

141

("

Bray, supra note 2, at 59 60 (concluding that the modern "Antiquities Act and the statue

statutes are fundamentally different").
141 See supra notes 34 36 and accompanying text; see also Bray, supra note 9, at 20 44 (reviewing
the history and evolution of each of the statue statutes).
142 See supra note 37 (discussing the history and evolution of Virginia's statue statute).
143See supra text accompanying notes 36 38.
144 6 ANNALS OF CONG, 803 (1800) (quoting North Carolina Congressman Nathaniel Macon).
14'

Arthur S. Marks, The Statue of King George III in New York and the Iconology of Regicide, AM.

ART J., Summer 1981, at 61,65- 66.

146See Bray, supra note 2, at 4 6, 17 26 (gathering sources and describing shifting American attitudes
toward monuments and monument protection laws from the Revolution until the twentieth century).
147

Id.

4
1 1 See generally KIRK SAVAGE, MONUMENT WARS: WASHINGTON, D.C., THE NATIONAL MALL,AND

TIHETRANSFORMATION OF THE MEMORIAL LANDSCAPE (2009) (describing the recurring "monument
wars" of the twentieth century through the lens of Washington, DC.); see also LEVINSON, supra note 20,
at 21 (noting that it is difficult "to pick up any issue of a newspaper or magazine without finding examples"
of conflicts over American monuments); Dell Upton, Why Do Contemporary Monuments Talk So Much?,
in COMMEMORATION IN AMERICA 11, 19- 21 (David Gobel & Daves Rossell eds, 2013) (discussing two
great waves of monument building in this country, the first from 1880 and 1930, and the second beginning
in roughly 1980 and continuing through our own era).
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of their monumental subjects.
But despite being planted together at about the same time, the statue statutes
and the Antiquities Act sprang from very different seeds. As another work has noted,
the Antiquities Act embodies the spirit of the Progressive era, marked as it is by a
belief in the efficacy of the federal government, the benefits of swift federal action
for the benefit of all, and the value of academic if not scientific expertise in
government action.'4 9 Literally none of these things has ever been true of the statue
statutes. For example, as discussed above, the statue statutes are notable for their
rejection of academic and expert opinion about the merits and purpose of the
Confederate monuments that they protect.' " In addition, the earliest version of the
statue statutes was enacted not by federal Progressive legislators but by southern
Democrats in Virginia just a few years after they decisively defeated their opponents
and overturned the rights secured by Reconstruction in a series of nakedly
discriminatory state constitutional amendments.' 5 ' And perhaps most obviously, the
statue statutes, by the very nature of the monuments they seek to protect, are clearly
not characterized by a particularly strong belief in the efficacy or benevolence of
anything to do with the federal government.
As discussed above, most of the statue statutes were enacted by states soon after
discriminatory laws were passed, or during periods of massive statewide resistance
to integration, or after episodes of racist violence.' 5 2 In this, the statue statutes
resemble the monuments that they protect: they are indelibly linked with postReconstruction pattems of racial discrimination and violence rather than near-Civil
War efforts at commemoration and remembrance.
Compared to the statue statutes and the monuments that they were designed to
protect, the Antiquities Act is less charged with such a history of institutional racism
and violence. But the Antiquities Act has its own troubling history. Like many of the
country's earliest laws promoting the conservation or preservation of natural
resources, the Antiquities Act frequently has been deployed in ways that deprived
Native Americans and other traditionally marginalized communities from access to

4 Krakoff, supra note 119, at 218 19.
'5"See supra notes 15 27, 37 40, 52 57 and accompanying text.
"' See James W. Fox, Jr., Intimations of Citizenship: Repressions and Expressions qf Equal
Citizenship in the Era ofJim Crow, 50 1low. L.J, 113, 133-34 (2006) (quoting, inter alia, Carter Glass,
later Secretary of the Treasury under Woodrow Wilson), Describing the voting restrictions adopted by the
Virginia Constitutional Convention in 1900, just a few short years before Virginia's legislature enacted
the first statue statutes, Glass responded as follows when asked if the state constitutional reforms would
discriminate:
Discrimination! Why, that is precisely what we propose; that, exactly is what this
Convention was elected for to discriminate to the very extremity of permissible
action under the limitation of the Federal Constitution, with a view to the
elimination of every negro voter who can be gotten rid of, legally, without
materially impairing the numerical strength of the [W]hite electorate.
Id. at 134 (quoting Glass).
152See supra notes 25 26, 40,40 44, 151 and accompanying text; see also Bray, supranote 9, at 13
17, 20 44 (discussing the histories of the statue statutes).
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land and resources without compensation or consent. 153
It is a mistake, in other words, to ascribe a simple narrative of upward moral
progress to the Antiquities Act or the evolution of national monuments-and in many
ways current debates about public land use involving the Antiquities Act and national
monuments fall short of a fully inclusive discourse that takes into account the
interests and rights of all interested parties.' 54 In recent years, however, the shift in
how national monument decisions get made has helped to address some of the
historic injustices associated with monument proclamations and other federal land
use decisions.155 The original designation of the Bears Ears National Monument is
an obvious example of this trend, but other work has also noted how other recent
monument designations also embody this partial transformation of the Antiquities
Act into a "vehicle[] for equality and justice," including the CUsar Chfivez, Charles
56
Young Buffalo Soldiers, and Stonewall National Monuments discussed above. In
contrast, however, the statue statutes remain stagnant: to the extent that they have
changed, it is because state legislatures have amended them to make them ever more
regressive and restrictive, at least in terms of the monuments they seek to preserve
and the limits they attempt to impose on local governments.' 57
The statue statutes and the Antiquities Act are similar in another way--or, at
least, they used to be similar, until presidents of both parties adopted a different
approach to the Antiquities Act as described in Section II.A above, and this change
and the current contrast between the two offers a final set of useful comparisons. As
described above, throughout much the twentieth century, it was easy for presidential
decisions about national monuments to seem arbitrary to local and regional
opponents of those decisions. After all, most early national monument proclamations

5

' Krakoff, supra note H19, at 214 16.

154

id.

..Id. at 216; see also supra notes 119 121 and accompanying text (discussing the approach pursued

by the Obama Administration and various local, state, and regional stakeholders in developing the initial
Bears Ears designation).
116, Krakoff, supra note 119, at 216, 216 n.20 (discussing these and other recent monuments
as examples),
'5 For example, shortly after Memphis's victory in the trial court in the litigation of Sons of
Confederate Veterans v. City of Memphis, No. M2018-01096-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 2355332, at *9
(Tenn. Ct. App. June 4, 2019), the Tennessee legislature amended the statute, in an attempt to prevent
other Tennessee cities from using Memphis's approach to comply with the statue statute while removing
or altering Confederate monuments in public places. 2018 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 1033 (codified as amended
at TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412 (2020)).
At around this same time, the Tennessee state legislature also voted to remove $250,000 from the
state's 2019 budget that previously had been intended to celebrate Memphis's bicentennial. Chas Sisk,
Tennessee Strips $250,000from Memphis as Payback for Removing ConfederateStatues, NPR (Apr. 18,

2018, 11:02 AM), https://www npr.org/2018/04/18/603525897/tennessee-strips-250-000-from-memphisas-payback-for-removing-confederate-statue [https:/perma.cc/VN5L-ULPF]. Several state legislators
upset at the Confederate monuments' removal justified their votes for this budget change by blaming the
city for its "sneaky" and successful attempt to remove Confederate monuments while complying with the
statue statute through the hard work of "smart lawyers." Id.
For more detail on the Tennessee statue statute, the techniques used by Memphis to remove
Confederate monuments while complying with the then-current version of the state's statue statute, the
legislature's subsequent changes to the statute, and the legislature's punitive (and petty) approach to the
funds once marked for Memphis's bicentennial, see Bray, supra note 9, at 27 31.
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provided little to no detail about why the specific resources that were being preserved
were worthy of protection, and reviewing courts had essentially read most of the
58
Antiquities Act's substantive restrictions right out of the statute.,
The Antiquities Act as implemented today is also far from perfect--it retains
some of its historically arbitrary character and should be reformed in some
particulars. 159 But in recent decades the Antiquities Act has been implemented in
ways that are quite different than the ways it was implemented in the first half of the
twentieth century and vastly different than the ways that the statue statutes have
always been implemented. Beyond their association with patterns of institutionalized
discrimination and violence, the statue statutes appear at least as arbitrary and
unjustifiable as the most locally oppressive national monuments designated with the
vaguest of proclamations, for a number of reasons that will be explored immediately
below.
One of the most arbitrary features of most statue statutes is the scope of their
coverage: they tend to cover all monuments within a state, so long as the monument
meets their minimal definitional criteria. 6 ' For example, Alabama's statue statute
protects all monuments located on public property and intended to be a "permanent
memorial" to any event, person, group, "movement, or military service that is part
of the history of the people or geography now comprising the State of Alabama"
from any sort of relocation, removal, alteration, renaming, or disturbance. 6 ' There
is, in other words, no 'opt-in' or discretion that can be exercised about what the
statute protects--everything within the state's borders that fits the expansive
statutory definition of "monument" is presumptively covered, and although there is
a cumbersome process through which local governments can ask a special
Committee on Alabama Monument Protection for subsequent relief from the
statute's coverage, this is available only for monuments that have been around for
less than forty years.' 2
To take another example, South Carolina's statue statute is similarly broad in the
scope of its coverage. More specifically, it protects all monuments and
memorials-terms that are otherwise undefined- -erected on public property that
have as their subject any one of ten military conflicts, ranging from the
Revolutionary War to the Persian Gulf War, and including the "War Between the

158See supra notes 90 102 and accompanying text.
'' See Bray, supra note 2, at 57 60 (offering suggestions for reforming the Antiquities Act).
155 See infra notes 161 165 and accompanying text. There is, however, one counter-example:
Kentucky's statue statute is potentially as broad as other states in terms of the types of monuments that
the statute can protect, but it is procedurally more selective, More specifically, the Kentucky statue statute
requires the Kentucky Military Heritage Commission to approve monuments that otherwise meet the
statute's requirements be/ore they are covered. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 171.780, 171 784, 171.786
(West 2020). For more information about this and other aspects of'Kentucky's statue statute, see Bray,
supra note 9, at 39 40.
' ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-232(a), 41-9-231 (2020). The statute also protects "architecturally significant
building[s]", as well as "memorial building[s]" and "memorial street[s]." Id. § 41-9-232(a).
162Id. §§ 41-9-232(b), 41-9-235. To be precise, relief through the special Committee on Alabama
Monument Protection is available only for monuments that have been around for less than forty years but
more than twenty years. Id. § 41 -9- 232(b) For more information about this and other aspects of Alabama's
statue statute, see Bray, supra note 9, at 31 34.
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States," as well as monuments or memorials to "Native American" or
"African-American History." 163 There is, in other words, no 'opt-in' or discretion
that can be exercised about what the statute protects-as in Alabama, everything
within the state's borders that fits the expansive statutory definition of "monument"
is presumptively covered. Like Alabama's statute, South Carolina's statute contains
a process through which local governments or other parties can seek relief from the
statute's protection for qualifying monuments.164 Unlike Alabama's statute, this
process does not involve a special committee; rather, the only process contemplated
monument protection is a
under South Carolina's statue statute for relief from
65
subsequent two-thirds vote of the state legislature. 1
The contrast here with the Antiquities Act is obvious. Although the process of
national monument designation has been criticized for decades by some as a
relatively arbitrary process that gives too much discretion to presidents to designate
unnecessary monuments, the process does require some monument-specific
discretionaryprotective action by presidents. And even in the case of 'midnight'
monument proclamations made near the end of an administration and a change in the
governing party, 66 the affirmative act of designating a national monument pursuant
to the Antiquities Act carries with it the possibility of some political repercussions,
if only for the outgoing president's political party in future elections. In contrast,
almost all of the statue statutes impose a blanket of protections on all monuments
within their jurisdiction and their broad statutory terms, providing only the most
remote possibilities for discretionary relief from these protections.
The arbitrary breadth of many statue statutes is compounded by the absence of
any meaningful justification for this breadth--or, indeed, the absence of any
meaningful justification in the statutes' text, legislative history, or application. The
fundamental problem here, of course, is that identified by Du Bois almost ninety
years ago167: any earnest attempt to justify the statue statutes in terms of the
Confederate monuments they are designed to protect is almost certainly doomed to
failure. And thus many of the statue statutes tend to be drafted so as to protect
monuments to a wide range of historical events or figures, so long as the list includes
unspecified types of "military service" or "military heritage"' 168 - terms that will be
familiar, for discussed above they are frequently used to defend Confederate
monuments in the popular press. 169 Indeed, some commentators have used the term
"Heritage Protection Acts" as a catch-all term for these statutes, 170 so common is the
163 S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1 -165(A) (2019).
64

1 Id. § 10- 1-65(B).
115 Id. For more information about this and other aspects of South Carolina's statue statute, see Bray,

supra note 9, at 40 44.
1' See supra text accompanying notes 82 84.
167See supra text accompanying note 26.
168 See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text (discussing examples from Alabama, Kentucky,
and South Carolina); see also Bray, supra note 9, at 20-44 (discussing each of the statue statutes in detail,
as well as their common characteristics).
"See supra notes 16 19, 24. 28 and accompanying text.
69
17"Alfred Brophy, Wahlers on NC Monument ProtectionAct, FAC. LOUNGE (Nov. 28, 2015, 11:38 AM),

http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2015/1 I/wahlers-on-nc-monument-protection-act.html
[https://perma.cc/QCN4-QGAK].
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invocation of "heritage" in these statutes.
Instead of or in addition to such invocations of "heritage" and unspecified
"military service," some other statue statutes provide a long list of protected
monuments to conflicts that includes the Civil War or the "War Between the
States"' "--the latter term providing another clue about the relationship between
these statutes and the post-Civil War history of institutionalized discrimination and
violence. Sometimes these statutory lists of potentially protected war memorials
border on the absurd, including as they do conflicts such as "Operation Urgent Fury
(Grenada),"' 7 2 the French and Indian War, and the "Algonquin" conflict in
Virginia.' 73 The gravity of these historical conflicts should not be minimized-they
are not absurd in themselves-but their inclusion in these statutes is almost
ridiculous. After all, there are few if any monuments to these conflicts, and fewer
still monumental controversies about these nearly nonexistent monuments. Thus
there is essentially zero need for any sort of statutory protection for monuments to
the 1983 invasion of Grenada, aside from a transparent attempt to make a statute
designed to protect Confederate monuments look like something else.
But even if the legislative history behind most of the statue statutes did not clearly
demonstrate that they were designed with protecting Confederate monuments
foremost in their drafters' minds-and other work has shown that the legislative
history behind most of these statutes does clearly demonstrate this link 74 -- then their
use would confirm their purpose. Despite purporting to cover a host of other types
of monuments, years of monitoring the statue statutes have revealed only one
instance where such a statute has been invoked to protect a monument that does not
involve the Confederacy or a former Confederate figure--and that lone exception,
from Greenwood, South Carolina, rather tends to prove the rule, because it involved
a memorial to war dead from World Wars I and II with the names of the
memorialized dead servicemembers listed in raciallysegregated categories. '
Here, too, the contrast with the Antiquities Act is obvious and damning for the
statue statutes, though it stems from a point of initial similarity. The Antiquities Act,
again, is not perfect: there is something dishonest and therefore troubling about the
ways in which both its statutory text and the text of some national monument
proclamations fail to meet the actual reasons that presidents have for designating
national monuments. 76 The fact of this dishonesty and the underlying misfit between
1.C

CODE ANN. § 10-1-165(A) (2019). South Carolina's statue statute is far from the only one to

refer to the Civil War as the "War Between the States" so too do Virginia's, Tennessee's, and
Mississippi's. MISS. CODE ANN. § 55-15-81(l) (2020); TENN. CODI ANN. § 4-1-412(a)(2) (2020); VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.2-1812 (2019).
112TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(a)(2) (2020).
'7 VA. COD ANN. § 15.2-1812 (2019).
7 See Bray, supra note 9, at 20 44 (discussing the legislative history of the various statue statutes,
and their obvious and nearly exclusive concern with protecting Confederate monuments). Perhaps the

clearest such example is Tennessee's statue statute, which was written and introduced in both houses of
the Tennessee state legislature by members of the Tennessee Division of the Sons of Confederate
Veterans, which immediately hailed the bill as, inter alia, "one of the greatest documents in modern
history." See id. at 27 (gathering sources and quotes for same).
.7 Id. at 40, 40 n.266.
17, See supra notes 97 112 and accompanying text.
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the statute's purpose, the rhetoric found in many proclamations, and the true
purposes for which many monuments were created all combine to make the
Antiquities Act and its application appear77arbitrary in many instances, at least to local
opponents of new national monuments.1
The dishonesty and the appearance of arbitrary treatment associated with the
78
Antiquities Act may provide good reason for its reform.' But it is important to note
is born from an incredible
Act
that the dishonesty associated with the Antiquities
are so many good reasons
there
but
drafted,
bounty: the statute itself is very narrowly
were recognized or even
than
more
-far
monuments
national
many
preserving
for
anticipated at the time the statute was drafted in 1906. As the monument
proclamations surveyed in Section II.A demonstrate, this incredible bounty is evident
even if one examines only national monument proclamations that seek to serve the
sorts of values of heritage, service, sacrifice, and beauty that are invoked by
defenders of Confederate monuments. In the eleven decades since the Antiquities
Act was passed, almost every president has found more good reasons to designate
national monuments than the drafters of the statute were able to envision-and most
very popular with the public, including many
of these monuments have become
79
former monument opponents.
As this Section has shown, there is also something dishonest and therefore
troubling about the ways in which the statue statutes are drafted and work. But unlike
the Antiquities Act, the dishonesty associated with the statue statutes is not
associated with any surfeit but rather with a deep poverty. Unlike the national
monuments that the Antiquities Act protects, the Confederate monuments protected
by the statue statutes have grown increasingly difficult to defend with every passing
year, and defending them was already difficult, if not impossible, back in 1931.'8'
And because it is almost impossible to defend the true purpose of the statue statutes
without trafficking in the racism that is inextricably intertwined with the monuments
they protect, the statue statutes are surrounded in a tissue of half and un-truths: they
purport to be about things that they are not. This is a very different and far worse
problem than the dishonesty associated with the Antiquities Act-it is a problem so
significant that the statue statutes are beyond saving: they should be junked, along
with the monuments they seek to protect.
CONCLUSION

One final useful comparison can be made between the statue statutes and the
Antiquities Act, which has to do with the relevance that monumental beauty plays in
both statutory schemes. Of course there is no reference to beauty in the text of either
the Antiquities Act or most of the statue statutes: the text of the former refers to
objects of historic and scientific interest,'' whereas the texts of the latter tend to

17 See supra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
178 Bray, supra note 2, at61 64.
71, See supra notes 66 74, 80 and accompanying text.
'g0 See, e.g., Du Bois, supra note 26, at 279.
"""54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2018).
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82
refer to the importance of heritage, service, and history. 1
But although the statutory text of the Antiquities Act and the statue statutes are
silent about the importance of beauty to the monuments they seek to protect, others
have not been so reticent. For example, in a speech made years before the Antiquities
Act was passed, President Theodore Roosevelt lauded the beauty of the Grand
Canyon which was, of course, one of the first national monuments that he
designated once given the chance. " 3 In sites like the Grand Canyon, Roosevelt saw
a "wonderful grandeur" and a sublime beauty that he thought was uniquely
American, and in his address at the Canyon's edge, he urged his fellow citizens to
keep the Grand Canyon and other similar sites for future generations advice which
he took himself, at least once the Antiquities Act (arguably) gave him the discretion
to do so.' 84 As this Article has shown, most of Roosevelt's successors and much of
the general public have come to agree with him on all of these points. More
specifically, in recent decades, many of Roosevelt's successors have issued
monument proclamations that include many references to the special beauty of the
protected site or other aesthetic qualities,8 5 and public approval for both the
Antiquities Act and national monuments is typically strong, despite substantial local
opposition in some cases.' 86 In sum, much of the country has come to appreciate
Roosevelt's observation that the country is full of wonders like the Grand Canyon,
which every American should see in person if they are able, and which we should all
work to keep for future generations' 7 -through the Antiquities Act, if need be.
To take another example, President Trump has lauded the beauty of civic
Confederate monuments, many of which are protected by statue statutes, while
expressing his dismay that some cities might choose to get rid of these monuments. 8' 8
Insofar as this is a statement of a personal aesthetic preference, there may be nothing
worth arguing about here. But if one takes these comments to be some sort of
statement about the monuments' objective aesthetic quality, then they are generally
wrong: many if not most Confederate monuments in this country are lousy pieces of
mass-produced art with little connection to the site or the community in which they
are located. 8 9 Indeed, to argue otherwise strains the limits of human reason and
tolerance, much like every other argument for retaining Confederate monuments.' 90
In sum, as this Article's comparison with national monuments and the Antiquities
Act has attempted to show, the Confederate monuments protected by the statue
statutes are "awful things,"' 9' much like the statutes that protect them, and we should
get rid of both as soon as we can.

12 See supra notes 160 70 and accompanying text.
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